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After Herbert Hoover used the term “rugged individualism” in his 1928 campaign speech, the
phrase became a cornerstone of American politics, advanced in the 1930s in opposition to social
liberalism and New Deal collectivism. This thesis explores the political rhetoric and policy
platforms that dominated the Depression era, mapping a spectrum of ideologies that displays the
nuanced similarities and differences among and between the various political camps. Discourse
between Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the two main figures in the
political debate about government interventionism at the time, represented the pinnacle of the
controversy. The examination of these two Chief Executives’ policy intentions demonstrates that
Hoover and Roosevelt exhibited far more political centrism than first meets the eye. Based on
their rhetoric, policies, and center-leaning divergences from more polarized extremes, this thesis
questions the assumption of insurmountable polarization in American politics, and emphasizes
the utility of the relative moderation employed by these two administrations. Despite their
noteworthy differences, Hoover’s rugged individualism and Roosevelt’s New Deal exhibited
significant overlap, especially in their continuance of the American traditions of individuality.
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In Herbert Hoover’s famed campaign speech of 1928, he emphasized “the American
system of rugged individualism” (Hoover 1928). The latter term outlived his presidential
endeavors. Hoover advocated for a return to the previously-held approach of American
government, even though the term “rugged individualism” had not then been popularized.
Herbert Hoover’s seminal speech emphasized scaling back the government’s size and
diminishing intervention to reestablish the policies of limited government in place before the
First World War (Hoover 1928). In order to defend his conservative approach to government
interventionism, Hoover deliberately distinguished rugged individualism from the rising
ideology of social liberalism in Europe and the United States.
Social liberalism surfaced in American economic policy debates most visibly with
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s advocacy of a New Deal. In his 1932 campaign platform, Roosevelt
proposed a series of large-scale government mandates to form federal redistribution programs,
public works projects, economic reforms, and regulatory practices that jointly addressed the
economic crisis of the Great Depression. In Hoover’s reelection campaign, the incumbent
denounced Roosevelt’s New Deal proposals and defended the traditional “American system” of
individual freedom and government nonintervention (Hoover 1932). Unlike Roosevelt’s
insistence upon centralized reforms, Hoover hesitated to endorse federal regulations aimed at
mitigating the effects of economic devastation. Rugged individualism instead called for
economic policies that permitted cooperative crisis relief, but in a primarily voluntary manner.
Emphases on self-reliance, individual opportunity, and equal access to self-actualization
characterized Hoover’s political ideology, distinct from Roosevelt’s relatively collectivist
policies of social welfare and financial interventionism.
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Although Hoover’s rugged individualism evolved into a symbolic ideal of free market
capitalism, his ideology diverged significantly from conservative laissez-faire approaches. When
Hoover articulated his approach of rugged individualism in 1928, he outlined how this ideology
differed from the pro-business, pro-competition, Republican framework that denounced all forms
of community cooperation in the public and private sectors. Laissez-faire (“allow to do”)
economic policies put forth a system almost devoid of government intervention beyond
enforcement of property rights and contracts, with individual actors and corporations largely
determining their own economic affairs in their own interests. Although Hoover and further
right, laissez-faire capitalists all denounced big government programs, Hoover’s notion of rugged
individualism incorporated, and even encouraged, voluntaristic opportunities for cooperation and
collective support to advance common interests.
Just as Herbert Hoover’s ideological stance took a more centrist approach than far-right
economists, Roosevelt’s New Deal policies took on more moderate characteristics than further
left figures, who made propositions as radical as centralized socialism. Throughout the campaign
of 1932, Roosevelt sought the input of prominent economists to address the pressing issue of the
Great Depression. His ‘Brains Trust,’ largely composed of professors from Columbia University,
contributed expertise to Roosevelt’s formulation of modernizing economic reforms. The
Democratic nominee integrated a range of perspectives in his campaign team and subsequent
administration, but maintained the final say in deciding which views to include in his political
rhetoric and actions. For example, Rexford Tugwell, a key figure in the Brains Trust, presented a
more radical approach to national economic planning. Although Tugwell remained relatively
peripheral in the formulation of New Deal policies, Roosevelt gained valuable insight from
Tugwell’s proposed leftwing alternatives, along with recommendations from other left advocates.
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Roosevelt’s center-leaning divergences from Tugwell’s theories and his partial alignments with
Hoover’s initiatives indicated the liberal but moderate approach of the thirty-second president,
steering away from the far left policies of his colleagues and advisors.
In light of America’s historic and contemporary debates about governmental economic
interventionism, this thesis argues that the rhetoric and policies of President Herbert Hoover and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt revealed economic ideologies of notable opposition, but, in
reality, more moderate approaches than suggested by accounts depicting a stark dichotomy
between laissez-faire capitalism and social liberalism or socialism. In 1932, both presidential
candidates called for features of national planning in response to economic decline, though the
degree of interventionism and regulation differed between their platforms. Each candidate’s
campaign speeches insisted they offered polarized economic approaches, but their practical
policies demonstrated moderate, overlapping positions instead of the extreme theorizations of
government and political economy being advanced in the early 1930s. Although Hoover defined
rugged individualism as anti-interventionism, the ideology included a unique blend of
government involvement and community voluntarism. Roosevelt’s campaign in 1932 pushed for
a substantial increase in government mandates to correct the failures in the American economic
system that yielded the Great Depression. However, the New Deal incorporated certain
initiatives that Hoover had implemented during his term in office, revealing significant overlap
between the two politicians’ crisis management and broader views of governance. While
Hoover’s and Roosevelt’s rhetorical strategies highlighted their opposition to one another, both
candidates ultimately advocated for more centrist models of economic reform.
Although the presidential election of 1932 yielded historic partisan divisions, political
discourse in the 1932 campaign demonstrated considerable centrism and inter-party collaboration
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in a time of national crisis. The Great Depression threatened not only the livelihood of individual
Americans, but also the national economy as a whole. Debates about interventionism presented
salient and enduring arguments regarding the purposes of government, strategies for crisis
management, and the means to uphold human rights in modern American society. Hoover’s
strain of individualism, emphasizing strength of character, self-reliance, and generosity, failed to
secure his reelection, but the ideology has persisted in American political culture as a seminal
trope in determining the values of the nation. His intermediary approach to conservative ideology
helped ground his core tenets of self-actualization, united crisis management, and societal
progress in American political identity. Similarly, Roosevelt’s rhetoric and perceived heroism
permanently transformed the role of the American executive, along with major national
economic policies and institutional frameworks. His New Deal ideologies and practical strategies
shifted the national expectations of leadership amidst severe crisis, a set of political notions held
by the American public to the present-day. It is widely overlooked, however, that despite the
deep schism between Hoover’s and Roosevelt’s opinions on interventionism, the two figures
supported policies that shared significant overlap. The commonalities indicated the potential for
moderation of political extremes, even amidst national crises, and even when platforms appeared
diametrically opposed to one another.
In order to examine how these two figures pushed contrasting yet relatively centrist
policies, my qualitative analysis investigates the nation’s ideological clashes in the aftermath of
the market crash of 1929. Politicians’ discourses during the 1920s and 1930s illuminated the
differences between rugged individualism and laissez-faire economics, as well as the New Deal’s
divergences from more radical social liberalism. The center-leaning platforms of both Herbert
Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt, I argue, fell within a spectrum of American perspectives of
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government intervention that spread to the right and left of Hoover and Roosevelt, respectively.
To the right of Hoover were the pro-business Republicans who prioritized industrial growth over
equitable prosperity across the population, and still further right were the laissez-faire capitalists
who promoted entirely free markets. To the left of Roosevelt were advocates of a centrally
planned economy, and still further left were the center-state Socialists who championed systems
of collective ownership. As portrayed in Figure 1, the dynamic spectrum highlighted the
relatively moderate ideologies of President Hoover and President Roosevelt, as their more
extreme colleagues exhibited more polarization than the candidates’ policies.
Figure 1: The Ideological Spectrum
The following thesis proceeds in eleven parts. The first section looks at the origins of
individualism in American political culture, aiming to provide the contextual background to
ground individualistic rhetoric in long-lasting American traditions. Part Two provides the
business-centric, “scientific management” insights Hoover brought to his positions and strategies
in government. Part Three examines the perspectives of key figures in the 1920s who advocated
for business rights and freedoms in the private sector, including domestic protectionism and
national free markets. Building on the role of pro-business Republicanism in American political
identity, Part Four looks at the perspectives even further to the right than the business advocates,
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highlighting the preexisting political theory that proved foundational for laissez-faire arguments.
Part Five returns to focusing on Herbert Hoover and his response to the Great Depression during
his presidency, paying special attention to the Hoover administration’s executive interventionism
in spite of his anti-big-government rhetoric. Hoover’s rugged individualism met the opposition
of leftwing advocates of social liberalism, as detailed in Part Six.
After analyzing Hoover’s words and actions in relation to both the political left and the
further right, Part Seven examines Franklin D. Roosevelt’s national recovery plan. The 1932
campaign speeches calling for a New Deal outlined Roosevelt’s intentions and many of his
ultimate actions as Chief Executive. Part Eight conveys the prominent advocates of further left
political positions, including a member of Roosevelt’s Brains Trust, Rexford Tugwell. After
examining the range of influential political ideologies that contributed to the discussion about
government intervention during the Great Depression, Part Nine depicts the incorporation of
rugged individualism into the foundation of American political culture. In light of the debates
and interactions between and among right-wing ‘conservatives’ as well as left-wing ‘liberals,’
the pervasive appeal of Hoover’s individualism demonstrated the significant overlap between the
two political camps.
The final two sections of this essay reflect upon the significance of 1930s American
political discourses. Hoover and Roosevelt represented warring political stances, but the
spectrum of ideologies showed their relative moderation. The two presidents’ policies and ideas
included more common ground than meets the eye, an important political reality to remember as
the U.S. faces another era of deep divisions amidst national crisis. The Epilogue, Part Ten, looks
at how these discourses, debates, and overlapping policies provide insight into the state of
American politics in 2020. The Covid-19 pandemic and related economic crisis parallel the Great
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Depression, especially considering the rampant unemployment, nation-wide fear, xenophobia,
and economic stagnation. President Joe Biden’s campaign, election, and initial actions in the
Oval Office suggest a distinct parallel with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The examination of
politicians’ rhetoric amidst the ideological debates in the 1930s provides important precedents
for evaluating the political intentions, collaborative aims, and policies of present-day national
leaders. The rhetorical clashes and noteworthy overlap between the ideals of Hoover and
Roosevelt indicated how a seemingly divided nation may advance more centrist policies than
meet the eye. From this theoretical exploration, I conclude that the lessons from Hoover and
Roosevelt in the 1932 campaign might help to foster more collaboration and inclusion across the
aisle in present-day American politics.
Roots of Individualism
The ideological spectrum presented throughout this thesis provides insight into the range
of political positions taken throughout the debates about government involvement in and
regulation of economic affairs. As a student of both Political Science and Anthropology, I
approached this topic with the aim of examining the theoretical discourses at play in the 1930s in
order to characterize the American political identity that proved receptive to Hoover’s
rearticulation of rugged individualism. Many Americans’ backgrounds, narratives, and identities
coalesce around individualistic modes of existing and persevering. This culture connects to a
series of influential events throughout the establishment, expansion, and development of the
American nation. For example, as Protestants fled the persecution occuring in Great Britain,
colonial settlements were founded upon the need to rely on hard work. Protestant colonials’
religious practices reified the culture of individual discipline and rigor, as they strove to interpret
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the Bible by reading the text individually and forging their own personal connections to the
spiritual realm.
Max Weber theorized the connection between the Protestant work ethic and the ethos of
an associated economic system. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber
sought to identify the emergence of modern Western capitalism in relation to the Puritan value of
hard work. The elements of self-interest, sense of duty, material success, and moral responsibility
contributed to the foundation of ideologies that dominated American political economy
throughout history. Weber’s argument about the roots of individualism in political identity
paralleled James Truslow Adams’s historical perspective on rugged individualism in America. In
1934, Adams’s article in The New York Times examined the evolution and manifestations of
individualism, including rugged and other kinds, in American society. Although the American
population lived primarily in urban centers by 1934, he argued, “the legend of the farm and
frontier persists, and politically it is a great asset to a man to have come from one or another”
(Adams 1934). Adams drew attention to the domination of the American dream in American
political identity, applauding those individuals who managed to rise from rags to riches by
committing themselves to the hard work necessary for such social mobility.
Bazzi, Fiszbein, and Gebresilasse (2020) similarly studied the American frontier in
relation to the cultural persistence of rugged individualism. In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, colonial settlements along the frontier fostered individualistic identities, due to either
selective migration of those inclined toward that way of life, or the causal effect of the dire living
conditions on the residents of the frontier. The study found that in 2020, counties that historically
endured higher levels of exposure to frontier conditions exhibited more individualism and
resistance to governmental redistribution and regulation (Bazzi, Fiszbein, and Gebresilasse 2020,
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1). Frontier culture reflected the Jeffersonian ideal, as individualistic sentiments amplified faith
in an American exceptionalism and the presumed superior way of life that distinguished the
United States of America from the rest of the world.
Many theoretical analyses and empirical studies about individualism in political culture
have demonstrated the persistence of this key element in American identity. Philosopher John
Dewey further emphasized how liberty and freedom were perceived as diametrically opposed to
governmental action in American political discourse, especially considering the influence of the
colonies’ revolt and pioneer conditions (Dewey 1935, 29). The throughline of individualism,
from Protestantism to the frontier to self-interested entrepreneurs, came to the public forefront
with Hoover’s rearticulation of rugged individualism in his 1928 campaign speech. The
popularization of this term revealed a society and political discourse with underlying inclinations
to favor non-interventionist approaches to economic functions.
Herbert Hoover’s Rugged Individualism
Herbert Hoover’s rearticulation of rugged individualism was visibly developed in his
writings and policy enactments throughout the 1920s. In 1922, Hoover published American
Individualism, a book in which he emphasized “equality of opportunity,” so that the practical,
intellectual, and spiritual talent of each individual could spur progress in society (Hoover 1922).
This nonfiction work provided a quintessential account of Hoover’s ideals, highlighting the
importance of self-motivation to strive toward greatness. Hoover’s rugged individualism
idealized the notion of American self-actualization, inspired by Hoover’s own experiences of
social mobility and self-reliance. Simultaneously, Herbert Hoover, an engineer, businessman,
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administrator, and politician, acknowledged the value of community support, albeit in a
voluntary manner, to address the needs of the American people.
Hoover’s rhetorical emphasis on self-reliance in economic and social policies gained
credibility and influence from his professional and political backgrounds. President Hoover’s
approach to political administration embodied his ‘engineering ideal,’ as discussed in John M.
Jordan’s dissertation. Jordan (1989) examined the engineer’s ‘conquest’ of the natural world, and
the cultural authority of this profession, which Hoover subsequently wielded on the political
stage. As an administrator and politician, Hoover attempted to implement tenets of the
‘engineering ideal’ in the state, upholding social science professionalization by championing
economic efficiency and scientific management. In office, Hoover recruited political scientists,
economists, sociologists, and rational administrators to the Department of Commerce in order to
“modernize politics” and optimize the efficacy of his administration (Jordan 1989). This
approach to political organization reflected Hoover’s idealization of efficiency, running the
government like a business with a directed purpose. Hoover’s professional background
influenced his focus on economic efficiency and self-sufficiency in his orations of 1928 and
1932.
Although the words preceded Hoover’s campaign speech, the Republican nominee
popularized the term “rugged individualism” in 1928, integrating the phrase into the identity of
the American conservative. The president later wrote: “While I can make no claim for having
introduced the term ‘rugged individualism,’ I should be proud to have invented it” (Lohof 1970,
699). As a self-made millionaire, Hoover’s focus on national progress reflected his background
in pursuing individual greatness, benefiting from liberty and equality of opportunity in the
“American system” that allowed for such strides (Hoover 1928). Hoover advocated for “the
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American system [which] is founded upon the conception that only through ordered liberty,
freedom and equal opportunity to the individual will his initiative and enterprise spur on the
march of progress” (Hoover 1928).
Herbert Hoover’s rugged individualism reified ingrained tropes in American political
society, from self-reliance on the frontier to the opportunities for upward mobility of
socioeconomic status in a free market system. The phrase incited opposition to government
mandates, centralized relief programs, and compulsory participation in national plans. According
to Hoover’s political ideology, the government ought to remain the “umpire instead of a player in
the economic game,” so that the people played the more active role in financial stimulation and
national economic growth (Hoover 1928). This political approach placed the onus on the citizen,
calling for individuals to exhibit productive efficiency in order to maximize the output from the
national economic machine. Hoover’s rhetoric called upon all American citizens to pull
themselves up by their bootstraps and pursue their best personal outcomes. As a successful
businessman himself, Hoover had attained the rags-to-riches American dream, so he encouraged
and expected others to follow suit. This sociopolitical mindset certainly contrasted with his
competitor’s policies in the 1932 presidential election. Franklin D. Roosevelt advocated for an
expansion of government involvement into unprecedented realms of the American economy.
While Hoover voiced his commitment to traditionally conservative economic approaches
in 1932, however, his policies included a significant amount of moderate regulatory measures on
the federal level. Hoover encouraged voluntary forms of community support to yield public
value, especially in response to national economic crises. Whereas laissez-faire free market
capitalism opposed the expenditure of tax dollars to avoid burdening the private sector and to
minimize government control over money flows, President Hoover increased federal spending
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during his presidency in response to the economic crisis. Hoover aligned with conservative
theorists in his condemnation of government employment programs that required significant
spending from the federal repository, but, in practice, employed more centrist policies that
augmented government expenditure.
Pro-Business Republicanism
Although Herbert Hoover’s rugged individualism represented the more conservative
approach in the 1932 competition with Roosevelt, comparisons with further right colleagues and
thinkers in the 1920s and 1930s revealed the relative centrism of Hoover’s platform. While
Hoover’s political career paralleled that of Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, the two
businessmen-turned-politicians’ economic policies diverged significantly. As colleagues under
the Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge administrations, Hoover and Mellon presented the
business perspective on American fiscal policy. Because Andrew Mellon was born wealthy and
came to own several companies, he advocated for the rights of businesses and beneficiaries
without government infringement (Stoller 2019). During his term as Secretary of Treasury under
the presidencies of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, Andrew Mellon spearheaded the restoration
of political domination by private financiers.
Andrew Mellon’s political ideology steered to the right of Hoover’s rugged
individualism, but did not go as far as the champions of pure laissez-faire. As a pro-business
Republican, Mellon made way for unregulated business by striving to reduce all taxation on
individuals, corporations, and inheritance, and by opposing Progressive-era minimum wage,
maximum hours, and industrial safety laws. His economic philosophy held that taxing the
wealthy threatened the stability of society, similar to Hoover’s call for government
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nonintervention to achieve progress and prosperity as a nation. In contrast to Mellon’s
laissez-faire policy in the domestic fiscal realm, however, he compelled President Harding to
raise tariffs with the intention of protecting domestic industries and monopolies. Mellon’s
ideological stance of fiscal protectionism bridged the conservative robber baron politics of the
nineteenth century with the growing federal government of the twentieth century (Stoller 2019).
This pro-business, Republican position leaned right by denouncing government intervention in
domestic economics, but diverged from laissez-faire ideology by advocating for tariffs that
protected the efficient production of goods in American industries.
Although both Hoover and Mellon aimed to reduce government involvement in economic
matters, they differed on the extent to which federal regulations should intervene in the private
sector. Similar to his colleague, Hoover advocated for a return to prewar economic policy, such
that the government would scale back regulations to reflect the level of conservatism that reigned
before the First World War. When Hoover outlined the difference between rugged individualism
and the new wave of  ‘paternalistic’ liberalism, however, he clarified that rugged individualism
was also distinct from laissez-faire free market capitalism. Rather than leaving all market-related
concerns to the whim of Adam Smith’s notion of the ‘invisible hand,’ Hoover encouraged
government engagement in public works for flood control, navigation, irrigation, scientific
research, and national defense, accepting that such endeavors sometimes increased regulatory
power or commodity production as by-products of governmental actions. Hoover emphasized
that the United States ought not to implement a “free-for-all” system of laissez-faire. Rather,
mild regulations served to insure fairness, legal equality of opportunity, and American
individualism, with the intentions of preventing the domination of a singular group. Hoover
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maintained that, when properly regulated,  “the freedom of initiative and enterprise” provided the
chance for anyone without an inheritance to prosper.
During the 1920-1921 recession, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover convened
conferences to unite government officials and businessmen in order to optimize cooperation
(Horwitz, ‘Hoover’s early career’). He intended to allow the government to play a larger role in
economic issues by mimicking wartime policies in the financial crisis. Whereas President
Harding chose more laissez-faire approaches, Hoover urged government actions, such as public
works projects, during his conferences in order to avoid future depressions. Unlike the
laissez-faire approaches endorsed by his pro-business colleagues, Hoover sought cooperation
with the industrial sector to “do something” together for the public good (Horwitz, ‘Hoover’s
early career’). Herbert Hoover demonstrated the distinct nature of rugged individualism when he
undertook a more collectivist approach to the 1920-1921 recession, a strategy that foreshadowed
his response to the Great Depression.
Hoover, a seasoned organizational strategist, viewed bureaucracy through a pragmatic
lens. Rather than prioritizing the wellbeing of industry alone, Hoover diverged from Mellon’s
protectionist, free domestic competitive market approach by fostering more cooperative private
efforts for the public’s benefit. As Secretary of Commerce, Hoover chaired the Special
Mississippi Flood Committee in 1927, employing his practical skills in administration. He
established a hierarchy to direct the relief operation, exhibiting his belief that effective
bureaucratic organization could enable and stimulate grassroots individualism (Lohof 1970,
692). His relief efforts signified a collaborative approach to solving a collective problem. The
Committee united the thoughts and actions of various contributors, including federal, state, local,
and private agencies, in the decision-making process. In the early weeks as superintendent of the
Landress 18
flood relief operation, Hoover created a bureaucratic mechanism to “secure centralized direction
to all national agencies and coordination with all state agencies,” demonstrating the cooperative
nature of Hoover’s approach to the crisis (Lohof 1970, 691). Hoover consistently advocated for
citizens to join communal relief efforts of their own will for the betterment of the collective,
displaying how his concept of rugged individualism included more participatory, collaborative
elements than permitted by pure laissez-faire.
In order to scale back the wartime practices of government intervention, Herbert Hoover
and the Republican Party aimed to reinstate “our fundamental conception of the state and rights
and responsibility of the individual” (Hoover 1928). Hoover’s doctrine of rugged individualism
promoted not only the opportunities given to each individual, but also the “responsibility” of
each citizen to contribute to the progress and prosperity of the nation. The American experiment
consisted of “decentralized self-government, ordered liberty, equal opportunity, and freedom to
the individual,” praised as the sources of the economic progress gained in the 1920s (Hoover
1928). The ideal of “ordered liberty” grounded Hoover’s advancement of voluntarism, as
opposed to tax-funded welfare programs, reflecting the nuance of his conservative approach to
government interventionism. An examination of the further right positions on the ideological
spectrum indicates the relative moderation exhibited by Hoover’s rugged individualism.
The Further Right
While Hoover’s rugged individualism encouraged more collaborative efforts to build a
prosperous society, further right schools of thought advocated for significant reductions of
government participation in the economy. Andrew Mellon represented the pro-business,
protectionist perspective on American political economy: encouraging the reduction of taxes and
Landress 19
regulations and raising tariffs to allow the free market within the United States to progress
toward efficiency. Beyond Mellon’s business-centered views, influential political thinkers
Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner presented economic and sociological theories
advancing laissez-faire capitalism and other strains of fiscal conservatism. These two
perspectives demonstrated the body of thought that steered political platforms and actions to the
right. However, despite Herbert Hoover’s praise for individualistic policies, his tenet of rugged
individualism incorporated more nuance, centrism, and cooperative tactics than Spencer or
Sumner endorsed.
Herbert Spencer incorporated the disciplines of biology, sociology, and anthropology into
his formulation of “Social Darwinism.” The English philosopher coined the phrase “survival of
the fittest'' to define the role of the individual in an efficient society (Weinstein 2019, ‘Herbert
Spencer’). According to David Weinstein (2019), Spencer conflated mere survivability, a natural
property, with the notion of goodness itself, a non-natural property. Social Darwinism presented
a biological justification for merciless economic competition, asserting that those most “fit” for
economic success would gain dominance, while the “unfit” would endure lesser natural
outcomes and many would not survive. Herbert Spencer’s discussion of “natural” differences in
human capacities supported a non-interventionist approach of laissez-faire policies. In this
conceptualization of social evolution, Spencer conveyed a framework of progression: from
primitive political cooperation to militant hierarchies, and then advancing toward minimally
regulated industrial systems. In Spencer’s idyllic society, the government would wither away as
market utopias emerged with spontaneous, self-regulating, ever-growing economies (Weinstein
2019, ‘The Principles of Sociology’).
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As a notable parallel to Herbert Hoover’s emphasis on equality of opportunity, Herbert
Spencer prioritized the principles of equality and liberty in the organization of a just society. Just
as Hoover called for equality of opportunity, Spencer defined justice as equal liberty among
members of society. In Social Statics, Spencer wrote that “liberty of each, limited by the like
liberty of all, is the rule in conformity with which society must be organized” (Spencer 1970,
79). This view called for a foundation of liberty among citizens, because Spencer believed that
general utility thrived when individuals exercised and developed their faculties based on equal
freedom (Weinstein 2019, ‘Spencer’s “Liberal” Utilitarianism’). Spencer’s focus on individual
rights, in opposition to national planning, echoed in Hoover’s denunciation of government
interventions and prioritization of individualized success.
In Herbert Spencer’s The Man Versus the State, the influential philosopher advocated for
the maximal freedom of each citizen as the key element to achieve societal progress.
Government interventions, called “dictatorial measures,” had “rapidly multiplied” with rising
social liberalism in Europe, which “tended continually to narrow the liberties of individuals''
(Spencer 1982, 3). From Spencer’s perspective, modern social liberalism had increasingly
propped up policies that forced the actions of citizens according to the government’s dictates,
restricting the liberty and potential of civilians to actively contribute to society. Like Andrew
Mellon, Herbert Spencer fervently condemned taxation, considering the “compulsory” practice
an infringement upon the ability to spend one’s own income according to one’s personal desires.
From this perspective, taxes restricted the freedom of each taxpayer by reducing the “portion of
his earnings which he can spend as he pleases” (Spencer 1982, 3-4). Along with taxation, in
Spencer’s view, increasing grants for education, sciences, arts, and other collectivist policies
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solely yielded “further coercion,” as each expenditure “restricts still more freedom of the citizen”
(Spencer 1982, 23).
Herbert Spencer’s conservative works had a significant impact among political thinkers,
including the renowned American sociologist William Graham Sumner. Social Darwinism
played an integral role in Sumner’s socio-political-economic theories, especially in his
promotion of laissez-faire free market capitalism. Sumner’s influential essay, “What Social
Classes Owe Each Other,” originally published in 1883, advocated for conservative economic
policies as foundational sources of the citizen’s fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness in American political society. In accordance with Hoover’s promotion of equality of
opportunity, Sumner critiqued those who believed that “they have a right, not only to pursue
happiness, but to get it; and if they fail to get it, they think they have a claim to the aid of other
men” (Sumner 1974, 14).
William Graham Sumner called for unrestricted market relations, because government
interventions were deemed infringements of individual liberty. Aligning laissez-faire economic
policy with basic human liberty, Sumner explained: “a man whose labor and self-denial may be
diverted from his maintenance to that of some other man is not a free man, and approaches...the
position of a slave” (Sumner 1974, 15). From Sumner’s perspective, the implementation of
national planning would fundamentally obstruct societal organization, enabling one man’s efforts
to benefit another man’s satisfaction instead of his own. The individualistic trope of reaping
one’s own benefits reflected the rags to riches tenet that grounded the American dream: the
social ideology that any American could be successful if he worked hard enough to rise through
the ranks.
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This fundamental promotion of laissez-faire differed in some important ways from
pro-business Republicanism, because Sumner opposed monopolies and the tariffs that many
financiers encouraged to protect American industry. Unlike Andrew Mellon, William Graham
Sumner asserted that monopolies muted competition. Moreover, tariffs were, in Sumner’s view, a
government intervention in the free market, thus impeding economic efficiency and progress.
Although Sumner accepted minor industrial regulation in extreme cases, he condemned most
economic interventions and any form of egalitarian redistribution (Sumner 1914, 182). In order
to uphold the equal opportunity to pursue the American dream, Sumner condemned the invention
of new “theories of property,” which were responsible for “distorting rights and perpetuating
injustice” (Sumner 1974, 21).
Sumner critiqued cooperative social programs and opposed redistributive plans,
representing the conservative response to the kind of social liberal economic reforms that
Roosevelt would propose in 1932. A national pursuit of equitable outcomes ultimately
“necessitates a sacrifice of liberty,” he asserted (Sumner 1974, 15). Sumner spoke against the
“unquestioned doctrine...that ‘the rich’ ought to ‘care for the poor’” (Sumner 1974, 16). The poor
that benefited from such care represented a societal “burden” in Sumner’s view. Rather than
obligating or even encouraging the wealthy to give up their earnings, contribute to philanthropic
initiatives, and redistribute resources, William Graham Sumner invoked Spencer’s notion of the
“survival of the fittest:” “Certain ills belong to the hardships of human life,” Sumner urged
(Sumner 1974, 17). Inequitable outcomes were deemed “natural,” as not every member of
society deserved the benefits that the rich earned from their accumulated wealth. The people
considered “weak” by philanthropists gained unrightfully from receiving redirected resources.
Sumner deemed any redistributive effort, whether government-mandated, as liberal New Dealers
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would promote, or entirely voluntary, as rugged individualists would encourage, a waste of
productive forces in society (Sumner 1974, 19).
Rather than encouraging free-riding among the poorer classes, William Graham Sumner
called for active productivity by each member of society. In fostering an efficient society, each
benefiting consumer ought to contribute land, labor or capital to competitive market relations, so
wealth was a prerequisite to attaining the valuable output of the capitalist economy (Sumner
1974, 19). Sumner supported economic policies that steered away from providing relief to the
burdensome members of society, and refocused on the “Forgotten Man,” who “deserves our
attention” (Sumner 1974, 22). According to Sumner, these overlooked citizens deserved praise
because they were the hard workers burdened by others’ lack of productive output. Sumner’s
commendation of a “man who by his own effort raises himself above poverty” served to
encourage citizens to work hard to gain capital, as opposed to allowing the poor to benefit from
others’ extensive efforts to achieve industrial progress (Sumner 1974, 21).
Response to the Great Depression
The range of conservative ideologies came to the forefront of national discourse as
political figures scrambled to respond effectively to the market crash of 1929. When America fell
into the Depression, Andrew Mellon advised Hoover to scale back investments in people and
enterprises in order to expand the nation’s financial flexibility: “Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks,
liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate” (Krugman 2011). Business leaders voiced strong
opposition to proposals to expand government expenditures, rather than minimize them, during
President Hoover’s term in office. This campaign for retrenchment applied even to public
schools, evaluating educational institutions with the same criteria as other governmental
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functions that used tax dollars (Rippa 1962, 81). As president, however, Herbert Hoover actively
intervened in the economy during the Great Depression in a manner that reflected smaller and
less institutionalized versions of the very policies of the New Deal that Republicans would
scrutinize. Hoover expanded the government’s scope relating to federal spending, agriculture,
wage policy, immigration, international trade, and tax policy. A clear demonstration of Hoover’s
interventions could be presented numerically: government spending increased by forty-eight
percent, without accounting for deflation, during Hoover’s four years in office (Horwitz, ‘The
Hoover presidency’).
While President Hoover maintained vehement opposition to large-scale, unilateral
government programs throughout his career, his policies called for cooperation with the private
sector. Paralleling his actions as Secretary of Commerce during the 1920-1921 recession,
President Hoover summoned major business leaders to the White House to confer during the
Great Depression (Horwitz, ‘The Hoover presidency’). Hoover asked the businessmen not to
reduce wages, despite the soaring unemployment rates that could allow them to do so without
losing productive workers. These actions clearly demonstrated Hoover’s deviance from
pro-business, laissez-faire economic policies, as well as his intentions to foster voluntary,
private-sector cooperative measures instead of governmental mandates.
President Hoover favored certain forms of augmented governmental intervention amidst
the economic crisis, indicating his conviction that the market would not necessarily fix itself.
Government interventionism manifested in the 1931 Davis-Bacon and Norris-LaGuardia Acts,
which upheld unions; the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which increased tariffs on many imported goods;
and an Executive Order that blocked immigration in 1930, seeking to preserve Americans’
employment by minimizing foreign competition (Horowitz, ‘The Hoover presidency’). On
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December 31, 1931, Hoover proposed the following to Congress: (1) the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation to lend funds to banks, firms, and other institutions; (2) a Home Loan Bank to help
the construction sector; (3) Congressional affirmation of his Executive Order that blocked
immigration; (4) direct loans to state governments to aid unemployment relief; (5) aid to Federal
Land Banks; (6) the establishment of a Public Works Administration to coordinate and expand
Federal public works; and (7) greater enforcement of antitrust laws to prevent more “destructive
competition” (Horwitz, ‘The Hoover presidency’). To fund these new measures, Hoover also
proposed the largest peacetime tax increase in the nation’s history, which Congress subsequently
approved.
Despite his efforts to intervene at the federal level while maintaining the industrial power
of American production, Hoover failed to adequately respond to the Great Depression. The
industry heads agreed to Hoover’s requests at the conference held at the White House, especially
to appease union leaders and avoid growing strife in the labor movement. However, Hoover’s
efforts to foster private-sector cooperation backfired, since the maintenance of wages led to
layoffs and escalating unemployment. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff yielded a decline in
international trade, exacerbating the economic depression on the global scale (Horwitz, ‘The
Hoover presidency’). As exhibited by his failed incumbency campaign, Hoover’s
implementation of moderate government interventions in the economy failed to lift the nation out
of deep financial crisis. Caught between pro-business Republicans fighting for a free market and
the social liberal advocates of welfare calling for many more mandated government programs,
Hoover teetered at the cusp of both approaches, but ultimately failed to resolve the Great
Depression with his ideological compromise.
Landress 26
Clashing with the Left
According to Herbert Hoover, the American system depended upon self-interest,
promising a high standard of living in exchange for each American’s hard work (Sita 1962, 382).
Hoover advocated for equality of opportunity and the chance for personal development,
stimulation, and innovation, all while productively utilizing a person’s best endowments of heart
and mind. Opposition to collectivism involved the denunciation of large public bureaucracies and
centralized governments that inherently violated liberty, and, by discouraging individual
initiative, could never raise the standard of living (Sita 1962, 389). This call for equal individual
freedoms reinforced Americans’ entrenched rejection of hereditary class hierarchy and reified
the perceived exceptionalism in the United States: “our individualism departs from the
individualism of Europe [where] there can be no rise for the individual through the frozen strata”
(Los Angeles Times 1922).
From the perspective of Hoover and political thinkers to his right, American
individualism contemporaneously rejected modern social liberalism, Fascism, Socialism and
Communism. His ideology of rugged individualism encouraged the government to serve as an
“umpire” in balancing the needs of various actors, whereas other political creeds viewed the state
as master and the individual as servant. Russia’s experiment with Socialism was deemed a
“ghastly failure” by the L.A. Times (1922), as such collectivism failed to stimulate the
development and activity of the individual as a contributor to the larger economic machine. The
“American” nature of individualism and the individualistic nature of America were deemed
predominant features of the nation’s political culture, and key contributors to its economic
prosperity in the 1920s.
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Herbert Hoover’s 1928 campaign speech pitted “the American system of rugged
individualism” against “a European philosophy of diametrically opposed doctrines, doctrines of
paternalism and state socialism” (Hoover 1928). American exceptionalism came to the forefront
of Hoover’s speech: he asserted that government nonintervention had allowed for “unparalleled
greatness” among “our people” (Hoover 1928). Stark opposition to “paternalism” in European
government systems shaped Hoover’s condemnation of social liberalism, as he called for a return
to the prewar system that made the American economy unique. Hoover even characterized the
interpretation of liberalism that promoted government operation of commercial business as “false
liberalism” (Hoover 1928). In this view, bureaucratization of the market only “poisons the very
roots of liberalism, that is political equality, free speech, free assembly, free press and equality of
opportunity” (Hoover 1928). Rather, Hoover’s liberalism sought to limit bureaucracy, insisting
that political freedom in American society depended on an economically liberal “force[,] truly of
the spirit” (Hoover 1928).
For decades, social liberals and socialists had formulated challenges to views like
Hoover’s rugged individualism by denying that such individualistic approaches provided
equality of opportunity. In Liberalism, British theorist L.T. Hobhouse presented a seminal
characterization of social liberalism that informed the political environment in the U.S.
(Hobhouse 1911). By critiquing laissez-faire economics and endorsing social welfare, Hobhouse
emphasized the need for state regulation in economic and social policies if all members of
society were to have the resources they needed to survive and succeed. By combatting
conservative tropes of individualized self-actualization, Hobhouse provided a key voice in the
leftwing opposition, arguing that competitive market individualism did not bring about equality
of opportunity. Prominent political thinkers like Hobhouse on the left side of the ideological
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spectrum served as predecessors to American social liberals’ response to rugged individualism in
the 1930s.
Socialist Isaac Kushner (1922) raised similar concerns about the system of private
ownership of the means of production, questioning how a capitalistic organization of the
economy could possibly incorporate true equality. In accordance with the American dream,
Hoover’s personal story represented one example of an American citizen rising from humble
beginnings to notable financial success. However, Kushner asserted that even Hoover knew that
not all workers had the same chance to become wealthy, no matter how hard they worked
(Kushner 1922). In Kusher’s view, Hoover’s path to success was not realistically available to all
Americans, illuminating the limitations of Hoover’s notion of equal opportunity to pursue the
American dream. Kushner’s argument about Hoover’s awareness of inequities in the American
economic system gained recognition in a 1923 issue of The Youth’s Companion. The column
asserted that even Hoover would admit a fully individualistic system would prove incapable of
guiding policy (The Youth’s Companion 1923). In the decades leading up to Hoover’s
rearticulation of rugged individualism in 1928, the ideological left posited such arguments
against fiscal conservatism, establishing the foundation for the leftwing backlash against
Hoover’s individualistic rhetoric and policies.
Roosevelt and the New Deal
The most significant threat in America to Hoover’s ideology of rugged individualism
came from the popular appeal of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. Social liberalism
echoed in Roosevelt’s resounding promises to reform the inadequate American economic system
with his New Deal. Roosevelt’s rhetoric challenged Hoover’s assertion that the traditional
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structure of the American economy proved efficient and just (Zinn 1966, 45). In his campaign
speech, “Every Man has a Right to Life,” Roosevelt articulated the quintessential idealism of
New Deal policies. Negating Hoover’s doctrine of rugged individualism, Roosevelt claimed: “the
situation today only too clearly indicates that equality of opportunity as we have known it no
longer exists” (Roosevelt 1932b, 48). Rather than calling on the talent and voluntaristic
generosity of each individual citizen, Roosevelt emphasized the importance of governmental
policies “distributing wealth and products more equitably” and “adapting existing economic
organization to the service of the people” (Roosevelt 1932b, 50). In his advocacy for the “right to
life,” Roosevelt rearticulated wealth distribution as an essential component of equitable human
rights outcomes.
In Roosevelt’s view, discussions in government about political economy focused on
“whether individual men and women will have to serve some system of government or
economics, or whether a system of government and economics exists to serve individual men
and women” (Roosevelt 1932b, 46). Unlike Hoover’s characterization of government as the
“umpire” in economic affairs, Roosevelt argued that the “task of government in its relation to
business…[was] to assist the development of an economic declaration of rights'' (Roosevelt
1932b, 50). This proposed “economic constitutional order” ought to function such that every
member of the society maintained the right and the opportunity to make a living. Roosevelt
characterized government nonintervention, a “comfortable theory,” as “an invitation to sit back
and do nothing,” critiquing the passivity of laissez-faire political leaders (Roosevelt 1932a, 80).
Guided by Roosevelt’s proposed ideology, government restrictions to the private sector under the
New Deal would serve “not to hamper individualism but to protect it” (Roosevelt 1932b, 51).
This promotion of interventionism prioritized governmental actions to champion collective
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benefits for the nation, with those in leadership assuming responsibility for civilians’ outcomes,
rather than pointing to individuals as the primary agents in a free market.
In Franklin D. Roosevelt’s efforts to restructure the economy, he sometimes suggested an
interconnection between national planning and efficient and just outcomes. In his famed 1932
speech at Oglethorpe University, entitled “Bold, Persistent Experimentation,” Roosevelt
emphasized the need to try new economic structures, as the prior attitudes of laissez-faire had
proven unsuccessful (Zinn 1966, 77). The inefficiency of individualistic economic systems
yielded “waste” as the “inevitable by-product of progress in a society which values individual
endeavor” (Roosevelt 1932a, 79). Overproduction and inadequate distribution prevented
producers from selling their products profitably and civilians from obtaining the necessary means
to survive. The faults of a non-interventionist framework reached an unprecedented height with
the Great Depression, exacerbated by President Hoover’s failure to appropriately address the
needs of American civilians. In a denunciation of free market capitalism, Roosevelt asserted that
the laissez-faire approach required “greater faith in immutable economic law and less faith in the
ability of man to control what he has created than I, for one, have” (Roosevelt 1932a, 80).
Contrasting Hoover’s individualistic approach to societal progress, Roosevelt pointed to the
unsustainability of that preceding economic order, asserting: “we cannot make [our economic
order] endure for long unless we can bring about a wiser, more equitable distribution of the
national income” (Roosevelt 1932a, 82).
While campaigning for the 1932 presidential election, Herbert Hoover and Franklin D.
Roosevelt presented a distinctive dialogue about the future of the American economy. As Hoover
reified rugged individualism in his non-interventionist economic policy, Roosevelt called for a
radical shift in distributive processes, claiming “we are at the threshold of a fundamental change
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in our popular economic thought” (Roosevelt 1932a, 82). The turning point in 1932, according to
Roosevelt, steered the nation toward planning for commodity creation and distribution within the
American “economic machine” (Roosevelt 1932a, 81). Roosevelt’s rhetoric in the 1932
campaign highlighted his faith in America’s future amidst a dark period of economic devastation,
incorporating leftwing considerations of consumer bargaining powers, minimum wage, and price
fixing (Tugwell 1968, 57).
Franklin D. Roosevelt countered the preceding American traditions of
non-interventionism that allowed the economy to fail in such a dire manner. Unlike Hoover’s
prioritization of industry and upward mobility, Roosevelt’s campaign speeches applied special
attention to the woes of American farmers, denoting them “the forgotten men” (Tugwell 1968,
47). When Roosevelt prompted the recognition and remembrance of the “forgotten” agricultural
workers, the Democratic nominee utilized the same terminology as William Graham Sumner,
though with a very different intention. Whereas Roosevelt called attention to the suffering
endured by hard-working farmers and the need to actively mitigate their undeserved economic
devastation through public aid and services, Sumner advocated for the societal recognition of the
“forgotten man” who worked hard for his own hard-earned outcome and risked having it
redistributed to undeserving beneficiaries (Sumner 1974, 22).
By redirecting societal attention to the hard workers suffering amidst the crisis,
Roosevelt’s speeches intended to instill hope in his constituents and the American public about a
new economic approach. Roosevelt called for “faith in our institutions…[which] demands that
we recognize the new terms of the old social contract” (Roosevelt 1932a, 52). In reaction to
Hoover’s promotion of status quo, nonintervention, and business-centric progress, Roosevelt
emphasized the “vital necessity of planning,” because he believed that states could not handle the
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economic dilemma without federal aid and guidance (Tugwell 1968, 104, 78). Rather than
supporting the efforts of entrepreneurs, who, from the social liberal perspective, only behaved
according to their own interests, Roosevelt promoted the needs of the national economy as a
whole (Tugwell 1968, 114). In a healthy economic system, “the reward of a day’s work will have
to be greater,” in order to instigate economic stimulation starting from the workers’ purchasing
power.
As Roosevelt promoted his approach to national planning, the candidate simultaneously
moderated the more radical notions of some advisors in order to accumulate constituent support.
In his efforts to advance the New Deal, Roosevelt often eliminated the contributions of Rexford
Tugwell, the furthest left member of The Brains Trust, from his speeches, revealing his hesitance
to include far-left proposals in public-facing rhetoric. To maintain constituent support, Roosevelt
did not provide specific details about the type or extent of his intentions with national planning.
Regarding the possible federal redistribution of income, Roosevelt remained vague during his
discussions about the interactions between a minimum income program and rising prices,
because “a political candidate wouldn’t like to make such a complex explanation” (Tugwell
1968, 97).
Herbert Hoover’s defensive strategy in the presidential election of 1932 demonstrated his
perception of the New Deal as a preeminent threat to rugged individualism. On October 31,
Hoover gave a speech warning that “grass will grow in the streets'' if Roosevelt were elected
(Tugwell 1968, xviii). In the race against Roosevelt, Hoover employed the rhetorical strategy of
apologia in defense of his leadership amidst the market crash of 1929 (Carcasson 1998, 350). In
an examination of Hoover’s key radio addresses throughout the campaign, Carcasson (1998)
analyzed the candidate’s rhetoric, style, and approach to conclude that Hoover aimed not to win
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in 1932, so much as to defend his administration, character, and view of government. The
election outcome showed Roosevelt gaining nearly twenty-eight million votes, as opposed to
Hoover receiving fewer than sixteen million. The Great Depression dominated the 1932
presidential election, and brought a significant transition in the prominent ideologies held by the
American public (Tugwell 1968, xviii). Carcasson’s 1998 study concluded that this election
established not only popular support for a new economic program, but also reimagined the norm
of a rhetorical presidency, valuing Roosevelt’s emotional popular leadership over Hoover’s
behind-the-scenes administrative work (Carcasson 1998, 349). The tactics employed in the 1932
campaign played a pivotal role as the norms of the American presidency transitioned toward a
more populist rhetorical foundation that underpinned an increasingly interventionist national
government.
While Roosevelt appeared heroic in resolving the economic depression in comparison to
Hoover’s relatively passive approach, Hoover’s rugged individualism and Roosevelt’s social
liberalism had some noteworthy overlaps. Rugged individualism at first glance seemingly
contradicted every element of Roosevelt’s proposed economic policies: Hoover advocated for
self-reliance, emphasized voluntarism, and minimized government-mandated programs.
Although Hoover publicly opposed the New Deal, however, Roosevelt’s advisors acknowledged
that many aspects of the New Deal had their origins in Hoover’s policies (Horwitz, ‘The views of
contemporaries and modern historians’). Roosevelt even expressed his support for the
Construction Council, a trade association established by Hoover and the Department of
Commerce before the crash of 1929 (Tugwell 1968, 58). Both politicians wanted many of the
economic reforms that Roosevelt brought with the New Deal, except with differing degrees of
government involvement (Tugwell 1968, xxii). Whereas Roosevelt cherry-picked strategies
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formulated by his leftwing advisors and gained quick approval from large Democratic
congressional majorities, Hoover was obstructed by Democrats in Congress (after the 1930
midterm elections) as well as by his Republican traditionalist colleagues.
Throughout the 1932 campaign, as Roosevelt grew aware of the risks of overpromising,
he grew increasingly conservative, conveying more overlaps with rugged individualism than
initially seen. In “Every Man has a Right to Life,” Roosevelt articulated the quintessential
idealism of New Deal policies, but subsequent promises, such as intentions to balance the
budget, constrained the candidate’s original plans to restructure the national economy (Zinn
1966, 45). The parallels between Hoover’s rugged individualistic approach and Roosevelt’s New
Deal policies became apparent when distinguishing the former from laissez-faire free market
capitalism, because both approaches called upon the government to interfere with American
economic functions, albeit at different magnitudes.
The Further Left
Along with the commonalities shared by the New Deal and rugged individualism,
prominent leftwing political thinkers that sought more radical restructuring demonstrated the
relative centrism of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ideological position. American economist Rexford
Tugwell was a prolific and influential advocate for national economic planning while Roosevelt
developed his platform for the campaign of 1932. As a member of Roosevelt’s “Brains Trust,”
Tugwell contributed his liberal economic arguments throughout the early creation of New Deal
reforms. Since obtaining his undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral degrees from the Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylvania, this economist became a passionate proponent of “the
magnificence of planning” (Krebs 1979, ‘Magnificence of Planning’). Tugwell fervently called
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for governmental stimulation of economic activity in order to address the Great Depression:
consumers urgently needed to gain purchasing power. Jumpstarting the “producing machine”
depended on consumers having income so that they would buy goods, and then factories would
be able to supply them (Tugwell 1968, 43).
Tugwell was the most radical of Roosevelt’s advisors, persistently advocating for a
centralized plan to remedy America’s economic devastation following the 1929 market crash
(Zinn 1966, 84). Before Roosevelt took the Executive Office in 1932, Tugwell wrote a vigorous
argument to endorse national economic planning in an article entitled, “Planning Must Replace
Laissez Faire.” The economist called for “fundamental changes of attitude, new disciplines,
revised legal structure, [and] unaccustomed limitations on activity” as necessary components to
centralized planning (Tugwell 1932, 85). This radical assertion promoted an overhaul of
laissez-faire free market capitalism, a shift that would amount “practically, to the abolition of
‘business’” (Tugwell 1932, 85). The federal government, from Tugwell’s view, ought to engage
in both “planning for production” and “planning for consumption[,] too” (Tugwell 1932, 88).
Such adjustments required “a control of prices and of profit margins” in order to effectively
manage the consumer economy in the United States (Tugwell 1932, 90). Rexford Tugwell
represented the furthest left perspective among Roosevelt’s advisors in the Brains Trust,
reimagining the extent of government intervention to the brink of eliminating destructive
competition in the private sector.
In The Brains Trust, Rexford Tugwell conveyed a close account of his work alongside the
rest of Roosevelt’s advisors, depicting the contentious debates and collaborations in the
formulation of New Deal policies. Throughout his book, Tugwell continuously reasserted that
“earnings would only resume when there were customers for goods and services” (Tugwell 1968,
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95). The millions of unemployed members of society could not actively consume the products
produced by enterprises because they lacked the purchasing power. In order to implement
large-scale unemployment relief, Tugwell favored the creation of extensive public employment,
which, notably, would yield temporarily unbalanced budgets, an economic strategy that Hoover
and Roosevelt both ultimately abandoned. From Tugwell’s perspective, the government would
need to serve as a “residual employer,” providing jobs and compensation for living expenses to
stimulate the consumer economy (Tugwell 1968, 96). The financial dilemma called for a
centralized solution, because states could not uniformly address these employment issues due to
lack of funds. According to Tugwell, the federal government was the sole entity with “the power
to create and distribute income” (Tugwell 1968, 96).
Tugwell explicitly contrasted his centralized framework for addressing the economic
crisis with Hoover’s overall non-interventionism in theory and strategy. In Tugwell’s view, as
Hoover rose to prominence in American politics, the advocate of rugged individualism emerged
as the nation’s leading “defender of the faith.” Despite his failed incumbency campaign,
Hoover’s ideological influence on American traditions was acknowledged in Tugwell’s
observation of the 1932 election cycle: “He had by now erected a bulwark of Americanism”
(Tugwell 1968, 110). Rugged individualism, which emphasized progress, innovation, and
voluntarism, represented “an American way, rooted in tradition, firm in moral understanding.”
However, Tugwell’s advocacy for national planning sought to reimagine the central features of
the American political identity, upholding collective benefits and governmental participation in
the labor market.
Just as Tugwell critiqued Hoover’s approach of rugged individualism, the economist
pointed to the failures of the generally conservative solutions to the Great Depression. Although
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Hoover’s crisis management style diverged significantly from pro-business Republicanism,
Tugwell attacked Hoover’s “unjustified confidence in the business system” that obstructed
federal programming to resolve the depression (Tugwell 1968, 114). As Secretary of Commerce,
Hoover had sponsored extensive analyses of the business cycle, and although his commission
had made specific recommendations for financial crises, Hoover ultimately failed in execution.
Unlike many advocates of centralized economic planning, Hoover overtly opposed making
public funding grants, because he felt that men should work for their incomes. As a clear
exhibition of rugged individualism, Hoover set up private-sector committees to collect funds and
distribute charity while simultaneously attempting to reduce expenditures and balance the federal
budget. Tugwell reacted by arguing that Hoover’s 1932 demand, “the budget must balance,”
came too late in the depression (Tugwell 1968, 114). Furthermore, Tugwell insisted that
Hoover’s inclination to give loans to businesses instead of grants proved insufficient to jumpstart
the economy, since they had no means of repayment as long as business remained stagnant
(Tugwell 1968, 115).
While considering plans to jumpstart the economy, Tugwell referred to the distribution of
relief funds as a temporary solution that failed to address the root causes: “the disparities, the
imbalance, the uneven distribution” (Tugwell 1968, 43). In order to achieve a more sustainable
solution to the faults in the American economy, he called for “a change in the system” (Tugwell
1968, 44). Notably, Tugwell claimed that his leftist approach to economic restructuring was not
grounded solely in justice, welfare, or humanitarian inspirations. Beyond the moral concerns,
ending exploitative measures and establishing an equitable, mutual arrangement for economic
affairs served to sustain the continued efficacy of the American machine of production. Tugwell
acknowledged the dilemmas connected to his federal approach to income redistribution:
Landress 38
subsequent taxation to pay back the initial financial distributions and the inflation caused by
printing money could lead to higher prices and discourage consumers. However, the initial,
colossal implementation of purchasing power would open opportunities to protect industries and
institutions via debt moratoria, simplified bankruptcy proceedings, and other mechanisms to
permit fresh starts for small enterprises (Tugwell 1968, 97).
As an influential member of Roosevelt’s Brain Trust, and, subsequently, Roosevelt’s
administration, Tugwell played a significant role in radicalizing the policies for economic
restructuring within the New Deal. Throughout his candidacy, Roosevelt asserted that
“something must be done” such as printing money, eliminating “the hopeless gold standard,” and
borrowing the money needed, without concern for government credit (Tugwell 1968, 116). As a
prominent voice in Roosevelt’s formulation of economic policy, Tugwell pushed for
“greenbacks,” the commodity dollar backed by commodities besides gold, since the value of the
precious metal fluctuated unreliably (Tugwell 1968, 98). In order to establish stability in the
American economy, Roosevelt similarly opposed the gold standard in his platform and
subsequent presidential actions. Abandoning the gold standard, the monetary system in place for
decades, indicated Roosevelt’s radical shift away from American economic traditions as
encouraged by Tugwell.
Rexford Tugwell’s calculated influence on Roosevelt’s rhetoric endorsing a more radical
ideology of economic planning was exemplified in a series of seminal speeches throughout the
1932 campaign. At a Jefferson Day dinner, Roosevelt gave his “concert of interests speech,” in
which the politician clearly communicated Tugwell’s ideas about cooperatively restructuring the
faulted American economy. Roosevelt pointed to “the necessity that there be a real community of
interests...among [the country’s] economic units” (Tugwell 1968, 48). Uniting the country for the
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purpose of financial collectivism signified Roosevelt’s intentions to plan “on the basis of a
shared common life.”
The Democratic nominee’s emphasis on common and shared interests reflected his
reimagination of American individualism in 1932. In the speech “Every Man has a Right to
Life,” Roosevelt asserted the need to restrict the economic operations of “the speculator, the
manipulator, even the financier...not to hamper individualism but to protect it” (Roosevelt 1932b,
51). This radical perspective, which connected individualistic ideals with government
regulations, represented an overt reconstitution of American traditionalism. Instead of
encouraging individualistic striving, economic competition, and innovative enterprise, Roosevelt
and his advisors posited a new and inclusive form of the American dream. As argued by Tugwell
and communicated by Roosevelt, the explicit emphasis on collective benefits, shared interests,
and community support reconfigured the very foundation of American political identity while
rhetorically perpetuating the nation’s tradition of individualism.
Rexford Tugwell’s further left notions pushed the Democratic platform toward more
central, nationally-planned solutions to the economic crisis. As a self-proclaimed “gas and water
Socialist,” Tugwell called for the nationalization of more facilities, on the model of the
centralized postal service (Tugwell 1968, 74). Tugwell’s radical perspective even extended to
U.S. foreign policy amidst the growing Red Scare, asserting that “[t]he future [was] becoming
visible in Russia” (Tugwell 1932, 90). Although Tugwell refrained from promoting full-fledged
Communism, he was impressed with “the power of the collective will” exhibited in the Soviet
Union (Krebs 1979, ‘Magnificence of Planning’). The economist similarly commended Norman
Thomas, the “Socialist” candidate in 1932, for “put[ting] the central problem first,” though he
found that Thomas’s “specific suggestions weren’t impressive” (Tugwell 1968, 440). Tugwell’s
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refrain from endorsing central-state socialism revealed the leftward boundary of Tugwell’s
political orientation.
Tugwell, the most radical advisor to Roosevelt, remained firm in his beliefs and loyal to
the Democratic candidate by bringing national planning to the party platform. Socialist candidate
Norman Thomas advanced a platform based on issues such as subsidies for consumption instead
of profit-seeking production, weekly emergency grants from the federal government, taking over
unused factories to be run by workers, higher income and inheritance taxes, and a five-day work
week. Though Rexford Tugwell was only somewhat impressed by Thomas’s prioritized policies,
Franklin D. Roosevelt was notably “intrigued” (Tugwell 1968, 439). Roosevelt spoke of the
“radical” crowd, claiming that those progressives were the only ones receptive to the notion that
“the business system had to be overhauled” (Tugwell 1968, 437). However, despite his
admiration for the Socialist left, Roosevelt insisted on the impracticality of Thomas’s proposals:
“they were reaching for the moon” (Tugwell 1968, 439). Some progressives or “liberals”
reportedly supported Norman Thomas, who promoted “revoluting,” but Tugwell argued that
“they ought to have been Roosevelt supporters” instead (Tugwell 1968, 283, 437). Like Tugwell,
Roosevelt expressed concerns about the Socialist candidate taking votes away from his own
electoral success as the Democratic nominee, indicating how Tugwell and Roosevelt both
remained loyal to their party while harboring some appreciation for Socialist proposals (Tugwell
1968, 439).
Although Tugwell’s centralized approach to economic restructuring in 1932 surfaced in
Roosevelt’s campaign platform, the Democratic nominee ultimately took a more moderate
position to formulate centrist policies. Roosevelt did not pursue the same types of nationalizing
projects as those of his more radical advisor, with the exception of regional experiments like the
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Tennessee Valley Authority (Tugwell 1968, 71). Taking a more moderate approach than Tugwell,
Roosevelt generally sought a relatively decentralized solution for the Great Depression (Tugwell
1968, 96). Roosevelt maintained private ownership but induced a rise in prices to liquidate the
burden of debt and unfreeze assets with the National Industrial Recovery Act, especially
prohibiting “destructive price cutting” in order to ascribe value to efficient production (Columbia
Law Review 1934, 1519). This method was detailed by Adolph A. Berle, Jr., another primary
member of the Brains Trust from Columbia University, whose ideological stance sometimes
overlapped with Tugwell, but usually remained less radical with regard to economic
restructuring.
Roosevelt considered views beyond The Brains Trust in order to draw conclusions about
the feasibility of an integrated economic system (Tugwell 1968, 100). Throughout his candidacy,
Roosevelt modified the speeches written by his staff to navigate the middle ground between
radical economic restructuring and maintaining appeal as an American politician. As a key
signifier of Roosevelt’s hesitation to endorse radical economic ideologies, the presidential
candidate often cut Tugwell’s contributions in crafting the campaign platform. For example,
Tugwell, among other economists, denounced the “make-work fallacy,” contending that reducing
hours of work could not boost productive employment in practice. Roosevelt, however, clung to
the notion that shortening the number of working hours would distribute employment among
more workers (Tugwell 1968, 75). From Tugwell’s perspective, Roosevelt “ought to say more
than he had been saying about what had to be done, whether or not the politicians approved”
(Tugwell 1968, 94). A notable exception was when Roosevelt gave the speech “Bold, Persistent
Experimentation” at Oglethorpe University as written by Ernest K. Lindley, voicing previously
concealed, more radical convictions. However, Tugwell was relatively “less happy” in response
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to Roosevelt’s renowned Oglethorpe speech, because Roosevelt appeared to promise more
progressive advances than he pursued in actuality (Tugwell 1968, 112). Thus, although Tugwell
and the rest of the Brains Trust provided key insights into Roosevelt’s policy formation, the New
Deal did not directly reflect the leftist intentions Tugwell favored.
Similar to how Tugwell advocated for policies to the left of Roosevelt’s platform,
American philosopher John Dewey was dissatisfied with the New Deal, claiming that
Roosevelt’s programs were not radical enough to address the social inequities plaguing American
society. Dewey presented an influential academic perspective on radical reform, focusing on the
theoretical critique of American individualism, privatization, and capitalism. As a philosopher,
he rarely recommended specific policy proposals as further left alternatives, though his writings
brought integral ideological contributions to the rising radicalism in the American political left.
In Individualism, Old and New, Dewey discussed rugged individualism in light of the ‘money
culture’ in the U.S., along with the shaping of individualism within American society (Dewey
1930). His critiques of American capitalism extended beyond laissez-faire, pro-business, and
rugged individualist ideologies, and he even pushed past New Deal policies to advocate for a
radically democratic, optimally inclusive welfare system. Although he did not outline specific
policy alternatives, Dewey strongly endorsed overall liberal causes, such as academic freedom,
democracy, and an “equalitarian economy” (Zinn 1966, 28).
In The Future of Liberalism, Dewey stressed the need to recognize historic relativity
while developing a salient contemporary political ideology. Traditional liberal social thought
failed to incorporate this recognition, conceiving of “the individual as something given, complete
in itself, and of liberty as a ready-made possession of the individual, only needing the removal of
external restrictions in order to manifest itself” (Dewey 1935, 30). This critique of older forms of
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liberalism broadened the discourse surrounding government interventionism, countering the
misconception that governmental action was always the “antithesis” of desired freedom (Dewey
1935, 29). Rather, Dewey called for the achievement of liberty by working within the
contemporary political circumstances to find more equitable outcomes, often by encouraging
more collectivist public policies.
John Dewey’s characterization of historic relativity in The Future of Liberalism deepened
the dichotomy between social liberalism and laissez-faire, free market capitalism. Hoover’s
rugged individualism represented “pseudo-liberalism” according to Dewey (Dewey 1935, 30).
Dewey’s call for contextual understanding suggested that ideologies yielding social change at
one point in history may “assume another guise” when they prevent further social reformation.
With the constant evolution of social relations, the associated concepts of individuality and
liberty should be continuously reconstructed under the approach of “experimentalism” (Dewey
1935, 32). For example, science and technology had transformed productivity and distribution
after the preceding wave of liberalism during the Industrial Revolution, which in turn affected
interpersonal relationships. In Dewey’s perspective, policy shifts ought to coordinate with the
practical reality that emerged from temporal and structural changes of the society, since those
underlying conditions influenced the experience of individuality under those policies.
In order to implement fair and effective policies that reflected democratic and liberal
ideologies, Dewey called for realistic studies of contemporary conditions to inform subsequent
political transitions. The formation of policy ought to be grounded in expert examinations of
reality, and respond accordingly in the interests of the personal development, individuality, and
liberty of all civilians, not just the “fittest” members of society (Dewey 1935, 33). The pursuit of
societal knowledge, according to Dewey, presented an integral endeavor in order to achieve full
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freedom of “the human spirit.” Modern liberalism, Dewey claimed, required “unremitting use of
every method of intelligence that conditions permit, and to search for all that are possible”
(Dewey 1935, 35). Thus, Dewey’s writings provided a new philosophical stance on social
responsibility, individual capacities, and equality-based means of production. Policy formation
should involve collaborative processes among academics, philosophers, politicians, and
constituents, so Dewey hoped his theoretical contributions would prove valuable in subsequent
policymaking to achieve freedom for individuals (Dewey 1935, 35).
Dewey’s work in 1939, The Old Problems are Unsolved, pushed beyond the
interventionist policies of Roosevelt’s New Deal, taking a further left approach to economic
reform. Despite Roosevelt’s attempts to reconstruct the structures of employment and
compensation, Dewey argued that such interventions remained reactionary to the economic
crisis, rather than proactive (Zinn 1966, 410). Hoover’s and Roosevelt’s emphases on efficiency
echoed in Dewey’s arguments, but the proposed means of resolving economic devastation
diverged significantly. His discussion of productive capacity reflected Hoover’s priority of
instigating societal progress and Roosevelt’s aim to construct a just and efficient economic
system. However, Dewey asserted a more radical means of achieving optimal productivity,
calling for the adjustment of individual capacities and their development to tailor workers to their
practical occupations (Dewey 1939, 412).
In Dewey’s view, the education system should focus more specifically on fostering
productivity and efficiency in the endeavors of a democratically planned economic and social
system. The rearing of an ideal generation of workers would forge an interconnected process,
bilaterally grooming the individual and the occupation to fulfill the most valuable role for
economic production. Critiquing the present method of economic development, Dewey claimed
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that scarcity of materials and a surplus of hard workers mostly benefited the few who dominated
the market (Dewey 1939, 412). Rather, economic policies ought to recognize the social
responsibilities owed to the unemployed, as well as optimize the productive capacity of the
system by eliminating the power relations inherently dictating a market based in scarcity.
Innovations, such as community control of industry, should be prioritized to persistently
experiment with economic structures, enhancing efficiency as well as advancing values of
democracy and liberty.
While an emphasis on economic efficiency pervaded the ideological approaches
associated with laissez-faire capitalism, rugged individualism, New Deal liberalism, and leftist
restructuring, Dewey ultimately took a more socially-conscious approach to the labor market.
With his advocacy for worker and community ownership, Dewey (1939) called for a
socioeconomic system that established a means of production based on free humans associating
with each other on equal terms (Dewey 1939, 413). Although Dewey and Hoover sought similar
ends (namely: societal progress, self-actualization of each individual, and freedom of the human
spirit), the two ideologists diverged in their theoretical approaches. The economic state of affairs,
in Dewey’s view, profoundly affected cultural freedom. Although Hoover intended upon similar
outcomes, he argued against government involvement in economic affairs. In 1932, Hoover
grounded his presidential campaign platform in non-interventionism, arguing that his approach
adequately addressed the economic crisis following the market crash of 1929. Roosevelt ran
against Hoover on a platform based on radical reform in order to steer away from the failures of
the preexisting economic system. In 1935, John Dewey evaluated rugged individualism, the New
Deal, and social liberalism, ultimately calling on the government on both sides of the aisle for a
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more active democratic approach that would establish a productive, efficient, and just
socioeconomic system.
John Dewey’s philosophy manifested in more Socialist politics than Rexford Tugwell’s
economic plans. Unlike Tugwell, Dewey endorsed Norman Thomas’ campaign, supporting the
Socialist candidate’s call for “revoluting” (Tugwell 1968, 437). Dewey did not express the same
concerns harbored by Tugwell and Roosevelt about the practicality of Socialist agendas, instead
advocating for a further left approach than the Democratic candidate and his advisors dared
broach. John Dewey’s role as an influential American philosopher paralleled that of Upton
Sinclair. Sinclair had a prolific career as a novelist and “muckraker” in the Theodore Roosevelt
era, exemplified by The Jungle, Sinclair’s powerful exposé of the abominable conditions in the
Chicago meatpacking industry (Zinn 1966, 10). As a long-time Socialist representing the furthest
left margin of New Deal thought, Sinclair insisted that “the only remedy…is to abolish private
ownership of industry and production for profit, and substitute public ownership with production
for use” (Sinclair 1933, 11). Sinclair and Dewey both remained steadfast in their relatively
radical political philosophies, whereas Tugwell and Roosevelt exhibited heightened
consciousness about the practical reality in the political climate. For example, President
Roosevelt refused to actively support Sinclair’s 1934 gubernatorial campaign in California,
because he held concerns about his public image if he endorsed such a radical candidate.
Roosevelt may have been a left-leaning humanitarian, but he was “also a politician” who had to
keep in mind public perception (Zinn 1966, 11).
Throughout the historic debate about government interventionism in response to the
Great Depression, John Dewey provided a theoretical framework to fuel leftwing ideologies. The
New Deal policies of the Roosevelt administration and the Brains Trust revived the notion of
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reconstruction amidst the global economic crisis. Dewey, a philosopher, allocated his energies
primarily to the schools of academic thought that helped set the stage for subsequent policies,
prioritizing equality, social responsibility, reciprocity, and productive capacity. Dewey aimed to
reimagine the social philosophy of liberalism, insisting that individual achievements depended
upon “the aid and support of conditions….including in ‘cultural’ economic, legal, and political
institutions” (Dewey 1935, 31). This philosophical endorsement for efficient democratic social
institutions asserted that collective development would valuably impact “the growth of
individuals who shall be rugged in fact and not merely in abstract theory.”
Legacy of Competing Individualisms
Even during the Great Depression, continued support for the American value of
individualism among political elites demonstrated the widespread appeal of individualistic
ideologies in American political culture. On the political right, conservative rhetoric endorsed
Hoover’s rugged individualism in opposition to government intervention, and this phrase became
a widespread trope among advocates of small government. Newspaper articles especially
exhibited the prominent political discourse with regard to the ‘rugged’ aspect of this
individualistic dogma. In 1934, The Christian Science Monitor published Massachusetts
Governor Joseph B. Ely’s concerns about the rise of “paternalistic” government practices,
advocating: “‘Rugged Individualism’ Best for the U.S.” (The Christian Science Monitor 1934).
The newspaper article critiqued the domineering governments in Italy, Germany, and Soviet
Russia, as well as the centralized features of the American federal government, especially with
Franklin D. Roosevelt as Chief Executive.
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In opposition to the governmental “domination” seen abroad, Governor Ely asserted that
the American people were “made happy, contented and prosperous” by the rugged individualism
of the past (The Christian Science Monitor 1934). Furthermore, President Roosevelt’s National
Industrial Recovery Administration could “lead to paternalistic socialism,” Ely warned.
Governor Ely’s speech articulated Herbert Hoover’s sentiment in religious terms, concluding that
establishing order in society “requires tenacious faith...let us never legislate to break in any way
the American faith in religion” (The Christian Science Monitor 1934). The speech by the
Massachusetts governor demonstrated the pervasive impact of Hoover’s individualistic rhetoric,
as well as the overlapping influences of political and religious institutions in U.S. society.
Al Smith’s shifting ideologies similarly demonstrated the wide-reaching appeal of
Hoover’s rugged individualism as a moderating approach to government interventionism. Al
Smith and Franklin D. Roosevelt were colleagues, allies, and successive Governors of New York
in the 1920s. Whereas Roosevelt came from wealthy, aristocratic beginnings, Smith dropped out
of eighth grade and entered the workforce to support his widowed mother (Kosner 2018). As
Governor of New York, Smith reformed insane asylums, created the state parks system, and
reformed the state bureaucracy (Kolbert 2001). Smith reorganized the state government on a
consolidated, businesslike basis, much like Hoover’s administrative approach, even though these
two political figures initially endorsed divergent ideologies about government intervention in the
1920s. In 1924, Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Al Smith to be the Democratic candidate in the
presidential election, even coining Smith’s nickname, “Happy Warrior,” in his speech (Kosner
2018). In 1928, when finally Smith received the nomination, he lost the election to Hoover due
to Smith’s identification as an “ethnic” Catholic, his New York centrism, and his lack of appeal
to southern and western rural voters (Kolbert 2001).
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Despite his interventionist policies as the Governor of New York and his defeat by
Herbert Hoover in 1928, Al Smith aligned with Hoover’s rugged individualistic approach to
American economic and social systems in the 1930s. The Democratic party nominated Franklin
D. Roosevelt for the 1932 presidential election, though Smith believed that he deserved it again
himself, piquing the tension between the two politicians (Kosner 2018). Smith subsequently
denounced Roosevelt’s candidacy for reelection, and accused Roosevelt's administration of
hypocrisy in 1936 (The Atlanta Constitution 1936). On a personal level, Al Smith resented
Roosevelt based on simple jealousy of his success in politics. According to Rexford Tugwell,
Roosevelt’s confidant and advisor, Smith also attacked Roosevelt for turning into “a dangerous
radical,” (Tugwell 1968, 49).
After Smith accumulated wealth as the head of the Empire State Building and of a bank,
the ‘self-made’ figurehead spoke out against both Roosevelt’s New Deal agencies and
communist Russia, implying a connection between those two systems of government. In 1935,
Smith and Hoover met to show their shared support for the Salvation Army; this public-facing,
symbolic meeting between the prior ideological rivals served to promote private, rather than
public, relief efforts for the Great Depression (Los Angeles Times 1935). Smith’s reversal in
political ideology and stark opposition to Roosevelt’s economic reform in the New Deal showed
when Smith campaigned for Alf Landon against Roosevelt in the 1936 election (Kosner 2018).
Al Smith’s policies transitioned from championing social liberalism to a more individualistic
approach, forging an alliance with Hoover and the Republican Party. This transformation
exemplified the heightened conservative emphasis on American individualism in relation to
government nonintervention, combatting the surging social liberalism reified in Roosevelt’s New
Deal.
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While Al Smith transitioned from Roosevelt’s relatively leftist camp to Hoover’s
center-right ideals of selfhood, a series of committed social liberals assented to the individualism
celebrated in American politics. Despite apparent opposition to Hoover’s articulation of rugged
individualism, many figures on the political left reinforced structures of individualism, albeit
through more collectivist means. Roosevelt’s New Deal proposals may have presented an
opposing threat to Hoover’s policies in the campaign of 1932, but the two candidates’ platforms
incorporated more overlapping ideologies than public perception might acknowledge.
Specifically, individualism represented a core element of American political culture that
grounded both Hoover’s and Roosevelt’s proposals, even if the means of achieving the goals of
American individualism were divisive and controversial between the two politicians.
Roosevelt reimagined American individualism to align with collectivist values, indicating
the enduring influence of American traditions of individuality on the New Deal policies. In a
radio address to the Young Democratic Clubs of America (1935), Roosevelt called for the “stark
necessity to unlearn the too comfortable superstition...that the American spirit of
individualism--all along and unhelped by the cooperative efforts of Government--could
withstand...every...crisis” (Roosevelt 1935). The President conveyed the myth of laissez-faire
free market capitalism, the hegemonic ideal that any individual may climb “the golden ladder” in
a land of equal opportunity. Instead, Roosevelt’s policies called for the aid, intervention, and
cooperation of government authorities in order to adequately structure an economic fabric that
allowed for self-actualization. He condemned the “errors of unrestrained individualism,”
insisting that the government ought to regulate the functions that would yield individual
prosperity (Roosevelt 1935). Despite his scathing critique of laissez-faire, anti-collectivist
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ideologies, Roosevelt assured a continuance of American individualistic traditions: “I do not
believe in abandoning the system of individual enterprise” (Roosevelt 1935).
Roosevelt both contrasted and built upon Hoover’s rugged individualism; the New Deal
brought significant economic reform while intending to maintain the core structures of the
traditional American system based on efficiency, productivity, and achievement. Hoover aimed
to return to a past vision of the American dream, focused on equality of opportunity,
self-actualization, and hardworking citizens contributing to an efficient national economic
machine. Similar to Hoover, Roosevelt pointed to the “freedom and opportunity that have
characterized American development in the past,” signifying a sentimental reminiscence of the
traditional American dream (Roosevelt 1935). However, Roosevelt’s proposals contrasted with
Hoover’s approach with regard to the means of upholding individual liberty. Rather than scaling
back government regulations to allow the individual to associate freely, Roosevelt emphasized
the need for the “collaboration of all of us” in order to “maintain...the individual system of our
day” (Roosevelt 1935). The most effective system of societal organization called for
“[g]overnment cooperation to help make the system of free enterprise work” (Roosevelt 1935).
Under the Roosevelt administration, political figures of ranging ideological positions
reified the preeminence of individualism in American governance. The President appointed a
progressive Republican, Harold Ickes, to serve as the Secretary of the Interior, a centrist move
that indicated Roosevelt’s attempt to appeal to a more moderate popular audience. Ickes
rearticulated a version of Hoover’s ideologies by arguing that the nation could achieve an
unprecedented level of prosperity if the doctrine of “rugged individualism” could be understood
to include cooperation for the common good (Robbins Washington 1934). As a prominent
politician in President Roosevelt’s administration, Ickes contributed to New Deal proposals by
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calling for regulations in the labor markets: outlawing child labor, sweatshops, and city slums, as
well as establishing unemployment security, social security, fair hours, and living wages. Along
with making the traditional statement, “We are individualists by long inheritance,” Ickes argued
that “We can so cooperate, if we will, and still be a free people” (Robbins Washington 1934).
This nuanced approach to the individualistic tenet of “every man for himself” urged a higher
standard of living for all members of a capitalistic society, thus merging the collectivist ideals of
social liberals with American principles of individualism.
Beyond the moderate appointee, even further left social liberals such as John Dewey
embraced traditions of individualism as an integral element of American political culture. The
title of Dewey’s seminal work, Individualism, Old and New, demonstrated his fundamental belief
in the evolution of individualism, with “new” versions of the ideology emerging among
advocates of collectivism. This book primarily critiqued “our rugged--or is it
ragged?--individualism,” with a focus on the descriptor as a negative approach to the tradition of
individualism (Dewey 1930, 45). While his left-wing philosophies fervently condemned
Hoover’s non-interventionist policies, Dewey found value in reimagining American
individualism to adapt contemporary political culture to a new, collectivist reality. In evaluating
“American life,” Dewey acknowledged the benefit of this system that “offers such unparalleled
opportunities for each individual to prosper” (Dewey 1930, 45-46). Social liberalism could lead
to the “decline of an individualistic philosophy [with] the formation of a collectivistic scheme of
interdependence,” transforming popular attitudes along with the structure of governance (Dewey
1930, 64).
In order to maintain the promising aspects of American individualism while restructuring
the economic system into a collective form, John Dewey philosophized that new systems of
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individuality would prove essential. Before individuality could achieve “[a] stable recovery,” he
called for the “elimination of the older economic and political individualism...which will liberate
imagination and endeavor” (Dewey 1930, 75-76). Throughout the development of American
individualism, the enduring problems of the nation transitioned from “pioneers wrestling the
wilderness” to “now [having] problems...from “social conditions” (Dewey 1930, 85). As a result,
the social problems clashing with this American ideology ought to have structural solutions. John
Dewey expressed his optimism regarding the American system of individualism, which provided
the freedom necessary to innovate in the hearts, minds, and creations of the American people.
His argument relied on “economic revision” as the essential action for “the sound element in the
older individualism--equality of opportunity--[to] be made a reality” (Dewey 1930, 76).
The social liberals’ receptivity to individualistic ideology exhibited its powerful
persistence in American political culture. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt and other social
liberals in the 1930s expressed overt opposition to Hoover’s strain of rugged individualism, these
left-leaning figures ultimately embraced the tradition of American individuality, while adding the
requirement to enact the essential social conditions that would allow equitable access to
individualism and actualization for Americans. Although their policy approaches diverged
significantly, Hoover and Roosevelt still found immense common ground in establishing centrist
policies to balance equality of opportunity, free enterprise, and economic stability. John Dewey
(1930) proclaimed the ubiquity of American individualism, calling the ideology “inexpugnable
and...of its nature to assert itself” (Dewey 1930, 120).
Aided by Roosevelt’s incorporation of a reimagined type of individualism, the New Deal
left a significant and lasting impact on American political institutions. In the 1932 presidential
election, Hoover lost his incumbency campaign while implementing a strategy of apologia,
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whereas Roosevelt captivated the American public with his rhetorical influence that ultimately
shifted the role of the Chief Executive and the dominant vision of the American political
economy. While the two candidates exhibited different campaign strategies, their platforms were
not entirely diametrically opposed, because both Hoover and Roosevelt upheld policies and
systems that served the goal of allowing American individualism to flourish. Both political
figures demonstrated enduring success in their policies grounded in American individualism,
given that the popularity of rugged individualism and New Deal liberalism have both persisted
until the present-day.
Epilogue
This thesis investigates the rhetorical confrontations of leading American thinkers in
response to the Great Depression, and, in closing, I explore the present-day implications of these
findings. With regards to the range of ideologies, journalists and critics may tend to emphasize
the polar ends of the spectrum, implying a starkly divided political reality. Highlighting
interactions between extremist groups and politicians, such as Representative Lauren Boebert’s
openness to the QAnon conspiracy, depicts severe extremism in American political culture in
2020 (Walters 2020). However, the argument of this thesis applies to contemporary political
issues by suggesting that, while deep divisions remain a reality in today’s political arena, perhaps
there is more support for centrist policies than meets the eye. With polarizing rhetoric
fragmenting the nation in 2020, the media has focused on the divisive nature of the Trump
administration: rousing far-right supporters of Donald Trump, such as the Proud Boys and
QAnon, and stark opposition, including the Women’s March and Black Lives Matter. These
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active movements embody the publicized political unrest that seems to never find common
ground.
In 1932, both Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt called for national action to
mitigate the effects of the Great Depression. The American nation was deep in crisis, and the
public called for strong leadership to guide the nation out of despair. Hoover’s campaign strategy
focused primarily on defending his leadership, character, and governmental approach in his
preceding presidential term. Franklin pushed for radical and experimental changes to formulate
strategic plans that could pull America out of economic downfall. Despite their divergent
rhetoric, the two candidates found significant common ground in their actionable policies for the
national recovery efforts. Thus, although the ideologies of these two opposing candidates were
widely perceived as sharply divided, Hoover and Roosevelt’s policies in practice signified
distinct but relatively centrist approaches.
This notable contrast between campaign rhetoric and executive initiatives called for a
reconceptualization of polarization in American politics. The rhetorical strategies utilized by
Hoover and Roosevelt in the campaign of 1932 mirrored in many ways those of the 2020
presidential election, despite important differences. In 1932, the nation faced severe economic
crisis, with a global depression causing rampant evictions, hunger, and joblessness. The
stagnation of the American economy hindered the progress and efficient growth that all political
camps desired for the national public. In 2020, Covid-19 spread across the globe, killing millions
and halting the dynamics that kept the economic and social systems afloat. With skyrocketing
unemployment, demands for childcare, and stalled production, Americans struggled to make
ends meet.
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Similar to how the market crash of 1929 contributed to Hoover’s 1932 loss, Covid-19
played a key role in Trump’s failed incumbency campaign in 2020. Both of these crises called for
new leadership to instigate a political change and deliver the services that Hoover and Trump
inadequately provided. Hoover committed his 1932 campaign to defending his conceptualization
of rugged individualism, which promoted the reestablishment of the prewar economy. Hoover’s
call for a return to a superior past echoed in the “Make American Great Again'' rhetoric under
Donald Trump’s administration. Paralleling Carcasson’s analysis of Hoover’s apologia strategy
that served to defend his failed administration, Trump’s campaign slogan for the 2020 election
was, “Keep America Great.” Similar to how the market crash of 1929 led to Hoover’s political
downfall, the economic downturn that resulted from the public health emergency in 2020
lowered President Trump’s approval rating. Trump supporters had previously praised him for the
success of the American economy, but his failure to mitigate the Covid crisis led to Trump
leaving office with an all-time low approval percentage (Gallup 2021). Much like Hoover’s
self-preservative incumbency campaign strategy, Trump’s platform in 2020 emphasized the
successes of his leadership and administration, rather than prioritizing the need to address the
crises that pervaded the nation during his presidency.
Upon gaining office, President Joe Biden has looked to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s model of
national recovery. Biden’s decoration of the Oval Office centers around a colossal portrait of
Roosevelt, suggesting Biden’s parallel intentions to recover from the public health and economic
crises via cooperative strategies. For example, the implementation of a mask mandate among the
Federal workforce indicates Biden’s centralized efforts to mitigate the Covid crisis, displaying
his alignment with Roosevelt’s public-facing efforts for crisis management (Biden 2021a).
President Biden’s Inaugural Address focused on fostering the value of unity throughout the
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American nation, attempting to address political fragmentation: “I know the forces that divide us
are deep and they are real” (Biden 2021b).
The polarization that pervades American political society today is, in President Biden’s
words, “real,” though the center-leaning tendencies in 1932 indicated that ideological schisms
may have more overlap than initially perceived. Similar to how Hoover and Roosevelt enacted
more moderate policies than their rhetoric might suggest, Donald Trump’s encouragement of
right-wing extremism has been far from consistent. For example, according to Representative
Beryl Anthony Jr., Trump communicated “a Democratic message” in 1987, indicating his bluer
values well into adulthood (Butterfield 1987). Toward the end of his presidency, moreover, in the
midst of the pandemic, Trump called for relief spending on a scale as large as that of the
Democrats, urging $2000 checks for most Americans. Trump has an inconsistent history with
stark Republicanism, just as Hillary Clinton, Democratic nominee in 2016, was the president of
the Young Republicans during her undergraduate years at Wellesley College. As politicians,
voters, and adversaries highlight the deep divisions between the red and blue political camps, the
overlapping ideologies can easily be overlooked. Vice President Kamala Harris symbolically
donned a deep purple coat at President Biden’s Inauguration, representing the new
administration’s political ambitions to reach across the aisle. While Biden upholds national
planning in his Covid-19 response, his policies remain far more centrist than the proposals of
further left Democrats such as Bernie Sanders, who advocates for policies as radical as free
higher education.
The New York Times columnist Michelle Goldberg drew notable parallels between Biden
and Roosevelt, referring to the conceptualization of “political time” argued by Yale political
scientist Stephen Skowronek (Goldberg 2021). In Skowronek’s view, presidential history
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incorporates decades-long cycles, each inaugurated by defining leaders. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
for instance, initiated an era in which both Republicans and Democrats accepted core elements of
the New Deal. Trump and Hoover were deemed “late regime affiliate[s],” characterized as
outsiders from the overall regime. Such presidents tend to capitalize on the “weakness of the
establishment,” stirring incentive to return to a prior political order (Goldberg 2021). These types
of leaders ultimately self-destruct, causing the old regime to crumble along with them. Their
reelection campaigns have never yielded success. Trump’s 2020 campaign could, in this view,
represent the final throes of Reaganism, which suggests that Biden’s presidency is bringing about
a new regime in the American political order.
The Biden campaign did not promise reconstruction in its approach to leadership, but the
administration has nevertheless produced a new political schema steering away from the Reagan
era. Skowronek characterizes Joe Biden as “a guy who’s made his way up through establishment
Democratic politics,” so President Biden is far from an ideological trailblazer (Goldberg 2021).
The end of Reaganism can be demarcated by the disintegration of the conventional
conceptualization of deficits, inflation, and the appropriate size of government. Biden’s
presidency represents “the opportunity to show that the government, by getting the shots in every
person’s arm of the vaccines, and building infrastructure, and helping working families, is going
to be a force for good,” according to Representative Ro Khanna (Goldberg 2021). In the face of a
devastating pandemic, Biden responds to the urgent needs of the nation with policies that mirror
Roosevelt’s interventionist restructuring of the role of American government. Biden’s $1.9
trillion American Rescue Plan initially included $1,400 checks to most Americans, an increase in
federal unemployment assistance to $400 a week, and a national $15 per hour minimum wage.
Unravelling the economic approaches of Reaganism, Biden reported: “Every major economist
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thinks we should be investing in deficit spending in order to generate economic growth”
(Goldberg 2021). Although the President allowed concessions to gain the votes of conservative
Democratic Senators, Biden proved able to win extensive popular support, even among
Republicans, for a major but not radical reform initiative.
Although Skowronek’s analysis of the Biden era highlights the potential for increased
government involvement, the political scientist also emphasizes the value of a moderate
president. He asserts, “It’s a mistake to think that moderation is a weakness in the politics of
reconstruction” (Goldberg 2021). Skowronek notes that Roosevelt was “viciously” attacked from
the left for not taking his supposedly ‘bold’ experimentation far enough in economic reform. In
this view, the reconstructive value of the Roosevelt and Biden administrations can align with
more moderate values, as long as they construct new political orders that completely reject the
failed regimes that precede them. Rather than conceptualizing moderate politics as a middle
ground between extremes, Skowronek posited moderation as “the establishment of a new
common sense.”
Conclusion
In response to the severe economic devastation of the 1930s, political thinkers across the
ideological spectrum argued for a range of remedial approaches. From Socialists to Social
Darwinists, businessmen to idealist politicians, American political society saw a series of
contradictions, transformations, evolutions, and disagreements. The ultimate question of politics
is how to organize the decision-making structures in a society. American democracy has, over
the centuries, championed the model of choice that centers the individual, upholding each
person’s freedom to determine their own life outcomes. The forefathers of the American nation
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built citizens’ rights on the foundation of ‘unalienable rights’ to ‘life, liberty, and pursuit of
happiness.’ However, prominent political thinkers over the course of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries argued for divergent understandings of equality, freedom, and natural rights.
The controversial discourses following the market crash of 1929 highlighted these contradictory
notions of American ideals.
Herbert Hoover’s rugged individualism took hold of the national discourse in the early
20th century, building on similar antecedents in Western political culture, and has remained
prominent in American political identity over the decades. In contrast, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
New Deal pushed policies that protected the economic rights of the polity by augmenting
government regulatory mechanisms. The clashing ideologies during the Great Depression, much
like the polarized political environment of 2020, demonstrated a severe rift in American politics.
In the midst of a global health crisis, theoretical controversies have similarly steered
governmental responses as well as public sentiment. This thesis analyzes the spectrum of stances
that fall between the polarized extremities of center-state socialism and pure laissez-faire. The
gradient of ideologies conveys the interacting forces that pull policy platforms to the right or the
left. Hoover and Roosevelt were opponents during the 1932 presidential election, and diverged
significantly in their policy proposals for addressing the Great Depression, representing clashing
ideologies that produced significant argumentation and controversy. However, although these
two Chief Executives could be perceived as diametrically opposed in their views of government
interventionism, their relative moderation and overlapping policies indicated more common
ground between them than first meets the eye.
The debates between the 1932 presidential nominees presented valuable insights into the
contentious dialogue between rugged individualists and New Dealers, while the common ground
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in their policy platforms signified the equally noteworthy moderation exhibited by Hoover and
Roosevelt. One matter the two political figures agreed upon was the persistence and efficacy of
individualism in American political culture. The ideologies of both rugged individualism and the
New Deal simultaneously saluted and reified individualistic values in American societal
structures and governmental strategies. Although Hoover’s vocal advocacy for
non-interventionism appeared to directly contradict Roosevelt’s government mandates and
federal programs, the two opponents endorsed more centrist approaches in practice than they
suggested in their rhetoric.
In the 2020 election, the American political environment once again exhibited stark
divisions, though analyzing the political discourse in the 1930s illuminated the possibility of
moderation in the face of heated rhetorical controversy. Michelle Goldberg (2020) characterized
Roosevelt as the initiator of a new regime in the American presidency, much like President Biden
has the potential to be as he pushes beyond the reconstructive efforts of former President Barack
Obama. The changing sentiments in the American political environment of the 1930s are
mirrored in the shifting reality of today. While the rhetorical strategies and policies transitioned
into an era of visible interventionism, Roosevelt’s ideological stance did not consistently oppose
Hoover’s rugged individualism. The center-leaning tendencies of these national leaders may
signify the intentional role of the current U.S. president: upholding unity, as proclaimed by
President Joe Biden.
Whereas professors, philosophers, businessmen, and regional political figures have
argued in favor of the further left or the further right, the executive administrations of Roosevelt,
Hoover, and Biden instead have upheld more center-leaning policies than the media have tended
to portray. Throughout Hoover’s and Roosevelt’s presidential terms, the throughline of
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individualistic approaches indicated that the value of individualism indeed characterized the
traditional political identity in America. While social liberals demanded equitable social
conditions to achieve universally optimal outcomes for the American individual,
non-interventionists called upon the ‘ruggedness’ of each citizen to work toward their own
self-actualization. Although different political thinkers across the ideological spectrum presented
ranging conceptualizations about the best means to achieve individualistic progress, efficiency,
and development, the notable common ground between the policies of Herbert Hoover and
Franklin D. Roosevelt suggested that supposedly divisive rhetoric may be reconciled to achieve
common goals and values in American politics.
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